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I. From Alliance to Relationship
The relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea is unique; 
the challenges it faces are not. Next-generation views of the ties between Seoul 
and Washington do not challenge the idea that the U.S.-ROK relationship con-
tinues to make up one of our most valuable and valued alliances. However, we 
do realize that, as in any relationship, the United States and the ROK need to 
continue to keep it fresh—a relationship requires both parties to work continu-
ously at keeping the alliance relevant and benefi cial. This is challenging not 
in spite of the depth and magnitude of our relationship but, rather, because of 
these qualities.
The U.S.-ROK alliance is defi ned by the mutual defense treaty. This implies a 
military bond that, while solid, tends to overshadow broader economic, social, 
and political ties. The military alliance is in need of realignment while the 
relationship, as a whole, should be further emphasized in order to bolster ties 
between Seoul and Washington. In particular, the post–Cold War era requires us 
to transform the military realm of the alliance from one focused on the defense 
of South Korea through deterrence of North Korean aggression to one focused 
more on the comprehensive security of the Korean peninsula and the Asian re-
gion. Furthermore, not only has South Korea’s role in support of conventional 
military operations grown, with President Roh Moo-hyun’s dispatching of the 
third-largest contingent of troops to support U.S. operations in Iraq and sending 
troops to other international operations, including Afghanistan and peacekeeping 
operations on the African continent, but U.S. forces’ increased fl exibility and 
South Korean support for operations off the peninsula will also allow the two 
to work more closely in response to nontraditional security threats.1
The goals are ambitious, but at least sights have been set. The challenge to the 
relationship, too often absent during discussions among experts, is how to get 
there. In efforts to provide a next-generation perspective of the future of the 
U.S.-ROK relationship as well as of the issues raised in the Korea Economic 
Institute’s 20th annual academic symposium, “Navigating Turbulence in North-
east Asia: The Future of the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” two American and two South 
Korean members of the Pacifi c Forum, CSIS Young Leaders Program, each with 
1 This was evidenced in 2009 during the ASEAN Regional Forum Voluntary Demonstration of Re-
sponse, hosted by the Philippines during 4–8 May, and the Proliferation Security Initiative, in which 
South Korea announced full participation on 26 May. South Korea’s revised Defense Plan 2020, 
signed on 18 June 2009 by President Lee, refl ected the content of Washington’s 2006 Quadrennial 
Defense Review, which articulated the U.S. military’s desire to expand its sights in Korea. Seoul has 
also embarked on a path of increasing joint cooperative capabilities and updating command, control, 
communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) capabilities.
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extensive experience in, and ties with, both the United States and the ROK, offer 
a joint perspective addressing the priorities of the relationship.2 By examining 
how the Young Leaders view and envision the U.S.-ROK relationship, one can 
glimpse what type of ideas and momentum may be in force when this genera-
tion takes its place in society. This perspective fi rst provides an assessment of 
the U.S.-ROK relationship as the American Young Leaders view it, followed by 
how the Korean Young Leaders view the relationship. Next, this paper examines 
points of convergence and divergence in the two views in order to highlight op-
portunities for the U.S.-ROK relationship to achieve and maximize synergetic 
effects. Last, this paper concludes with an action plan, or “fl ight plan,” to help 
navigate the relationship through the turbulence discussed in the symposium.
II. U.S.-ROK Alliance: How the Next Generation Sees It
When President Lee Myung-bak and President Barack Obama met in Washington 
and agreed to the 16 June joint vision statement, the two ensured the world that 
“our open societies, our commitment to free democracy and a market economy, 
and our sustained partnership provide a foundation for the enduring friendship, 
shared values, and mutual respect that tightly bind the American and Korean 
peoples. . . . Together, on this solid foundation, we will build a comprehensive 
strategic alliance of bilateral regional and global scope.”3 The biggest challenge 
for the alliance is not salvaging a Cold War relic but, rather, living up to the 
lofty expectations and visions for the future. This has not been lost on those 
of us, regardless of age or experience, who follow U.S.-ROK relations. Our 
next-generation perspectives on roles and priorities may, however, separate us 
from your average conference crowd as we view the relationship less from an 
ideological standpoint and more in a functionalist manner.
We realize that, although the alliance is not a relic, its foundation is. The 1954 
mutual defense treaty was designed to put boots on the ground: to defend against 
North Korean, Soviet, or Chinese offensives. The U.S.-ROK military alliance 
still serves as the strongest pillar of the relationship, but the rate of growth of the 
economic and social realms now outpaces that of the military. Washington and 
Seoul worked out agreements to make the alliance more mutually benefi cial by 
broadening the relationship and increasing its comprehensiveness. Agreements 
and timelines on the transfer to South Korea of wartime operational control of 
its forces, a visa-waiver program for South Koreans visiting the United States, 
2 For an overview of the Pacifi c Forum CSIS Young Leaders Program, as well as a list of Young 
Leader publications, see http://csis.org/program/young-leaders-program.
3 “The United States–Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty remains the cornerstone of the U.S.-
ROK security relationship, which has guaranteed peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in 
Northeast Asia for over fi fty years” (White House 2009).
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and negotiations regarding the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS 
FTA, the largest bilateral FTA either country has ever negotiated) all refl ect the 
broadening of the relationship or the creation of a comprehensive alliance.
Despite the efforts—and successes—in broadening the relationship to include 
cultural, social, economic, educational, and other realms, the security threat 
emanating from North Korea remains a core issue, and differences in policies 
regarding the North have played a signifi cant role in shaping the post–Cold 
War alliance. With the end of the Cold War, the democratization and growth of 
South Korea, and the U.S. shift in scope of focus from North Korean security 
challenges to broader regional economic infl uence and trade and political stabil-
ity, there has arisen the need for the relationship to evolve, yet the U.S.-ROK 
alliance remains squarely centered on the 1954 mutual defense treaty (White 
House 2009).
How will the U.S.-ROK relationship evolve? The alliance handlers appear to 
be aware of the need for change and are working in the right direction; future 
efforts need to concentrate on increasing public awareness of the benefi ts as 
well as the realities of the growing alliance and the continued shift away from 
defense-centric security toward a broader aim of maintaining regional stability 
and a platform for growth. An allied approach to China as well as increased 
ties with Japan, be it trilaterally or only through the channels provided by U.S. 
bilateral relationships, will be instrumental in ensuring that the U.S.-ROK alli-
ance maximizes benefi ts for both Washington and Seoul.
The U.S.-ROK alliance has outgrown its original patron-client relationship, and 
the ROK is especially eager to claim its status in the international community. 
We see this as an opportunity to take the U.S.-ROK relationship from its old 
alliance-focused mold to a more comprehensive relationship that takes advan-
tage of synergetic qualities to address issues of global scope. As global leaders 
recently recognized the limitations of the Group of Eight (G-8) and challenged 
the Group of 20 (G-20) to play a more dominant role in shaping the world 
economy,4 we see South Korea’s role as host in 2010 to be an opportunity for 
the U.S.-ROK alliance to project its ambitions on other economic players in the 
international community.
President Lee Myung-bak has set as a goal for his administration the repair of 
relations with Washington, and President Barack Obama has acknowledged the 
need to rebuild U.S. diplomatic infl uence throughout the world. U.S. interests 
4 In his statement, President Obama called the exclusion of emerging but relevant economies “wrong-
headed” and called for expansion of the G-8 (Barry and Raum 2009).
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and foreign policy aims tended to focus, rightly, on a global stage; and, although 
the alliance with South Korea was—and is—valuable, the question must be an-
swered: Are issues at hand challenges for the alliance, or to the alliance? Cold 
War “givens” are gone. South Korea has been calling for more equality; here 
is its chance to step up.
III. The U.S. View
We, as American Young Leaders, recognize the potential for continued growth 
in the U.S.-ROK alliance relationship, but we believe that the prioritization of 
the following issues (and potential roadblocks) is necessary to prevent the loss 
of the current momentum. In this section, we touch on concerns we have regard-
ing actions being taken by both Washington and Seoul, and we recognize that 
both allies need to improve cooperation. To do this, one issue that runs through 
all other cooperative efforts is the need for greater public diplomacy and the 
building of public consensus. We are concerned by nationalistic sentiment in 
Korea that has led to large-scale public outcry over Seoul’s role in the relation-
ship on a number of occasions over the past several years and that has kept the 
two governments from working toward a better relationship largely because of 
misperceptions.
Although many issues and variables need to be addressed by both the United 
States and the ROK, the following points stand out as priorities in the efforts 
of Washington and Seoul to modernize the alliance that has served them both 
so well:
Fill in the details. Create detailed road maps for projects named in the 16 June 
2009 joint vision statement (White House 2009).
In the post–Cold War era, the ups and downs of the alliance tend to follow elec-
tion cycles. The alliance was born in the fi res of the Korean War and founded on 
the common perception of a North Korean threat. As a result, who was in charge 
in either Seoul or Washington was of less consequence prior to the end of the 
Cold War. As the Cold War threats have subsided and the plethora of issues and 
interests has divested, the alliance has become more susceptible to less-deep 
public sentiment. Here, tasks are our friend. Broad visions for the future of the 
alliance are certainly valuable, but, to maintain focus, concrete, measurable 
plans need to be adopted and publicized. Many potential projects were named 
in the joint vision statement, including but not limited to environmental protec-
tion, research on clean and sustainable energy, coordination on pandemic out-
breaks and natural disaster response, humanitarian assistance, and support for 
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peacekeeping operations. While dialog has been ongoing between Washington 
and Seoul on most of these issues, political and academic discourse has driven 
away practical discussion on the particulars of the projects. Developing detailed 
and transparent goals and strategies, including specifi c milestones, will help 
to guide the relationship down a path relevant to the issues of today as well as 
build support for the alliance not only in our two countries but throughout the 
Asia-Pacifi c region and beyond. We urge Washington and Seoul not to delay in 
creating working groups and exploring public- and private-sector opportunities 
and assets.
Put the issue of North Korea in perspective. In addressing the future of the 
alliance, North Korea must be one of the issues, not the only issue.
Deterrence of North Korea can serve as a basis for cooperation both on and 
off the peninsula, and South Korea’s concerns and national interests must be 
recognized and respected, both in the realm of infl uence and in the realm of 
responsibility. The United States needs to remain fi rm that a solution to the 
North Korean nuclear issues comes through multilateral diplomacy within the 
framework of six-party talks and that South Korea’s national interests are not the 
only interests driving negotiations with Pyongyang. Washington understands the 
threat felt by South Korea, but both countries must keep an eye on how decisions 
regarding North Korea will affect other denuclearization and nonproliferation 
efforts throughout the world.
On other regional and global issues, Seoul must not be driven by how North 
Korea is expected to react. During successive administrations prior to President 
Lee’s election, North Korea perfected the art of manipulating the fears, nation-
alism, and hopes for unifi cation of the South Korean public. This has allowed 
Pyongyang to pressure Seoul indirectly not only on peninsular issues but also 
on or because of decisions ranging from cooperation in global nonproliferation 
efforts to the import of U.S. beef. So far, President Lee has been much more fi rm 
with North Korea than his predecessors, and to realize his ambitions for a larger 
regional and global role for South Korea, this needs to continue. It appears that 
the younger South Korean generation is less inclined to push for unifi cation at 
any cost, but at the same time it has proven to be very susceptible to Internet 
rumors and unfounded fear mongering. This means that North Korea will con-
tinue to incite and steer opposition to policies it sees as detrimental. Through 
increased transparency and public diplomacy, the South Korean government 
must continue to garner support for its strategy of broadening South Korea’s 
ties with, and impact in, the region and the international community.
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Clarify the issue of nuclear power for South Korea. South Korea and the 
United States need to reach a consensus on the future of the ROK nuclear fuel 
cycle.
This should be done before the upcoming Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
review in 2010, but it most defi nitely needs to be resolved before the expiration 
of the U.S.-ROK nuclear licensing agreement, which runs out in 2012. As signa-
tories to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Statement of Principles (GNEP 
2007), the United States and South Korea agree to “develop and demonstrate, 
inter alia, advanced technologies for recycling spent nuclear fuel for deploy-
ment in facilities that do not separate pure plutonium” and to “take advantage 
of the best available fuel cycle approaches for the effi cient and responsible use 
of energy and natural resources,” while recognizing that “states participating in 
this cooperation would not give up any rights.”
South Korea is pushing for what Japan and other partners of the United States 
have now; nuclear scientists from South Korea have already initiated discussions 
with Washington explaining their need to compete with other regional states 
developing exportable nuclear energy and their interest in becoming a supplier 
state using pyroprocessing techniques that do not separate plutonium from ura-
nium. Yet Washington continues to block Seoul’s moves to process spent fuel 
that originated in the United States (Nikitin, Andrews, and Holt 2009, 35). If 
Washington insists that Seoul not reprocess, then we need to offer an alterna-
tive; if Washington concedes, South Korea needs to offer an explanation as to 
why it would be more capable than other countries of successfully handling the 
reprocessing.
Maintain good relations and adequate troop levels. Washington recognizes 
that it has been successful in fostering a strong, self-determinant democratic ally, 
but it needs to more effectively and convincingly show its commitment; Seoul 
needs to clarify its demands.
As Seoul continues to meet expectations regarding its obligations for troop dis-
patch in support of U.S. campaigns, Washington needs to ensure that the South 
Korean people do not live under fear of attack from the North. At the same 
time, Washington and Seoul need to more concretely defi ne what they mean 
by deterrence and defense and, in particular, issues such as the U.S. preroga-
tive of fi rst response, preemptive strike, or other strategies. Seoul has asked for 
a more thorough explanation of the deterrent offered by Washington, but, for 
Washington to provide the answers to Seoul’s questions, the Lee administration 
fi rst needs to do some soul-searching: At what level and for what threat is what 
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response deemed acceptable by the South Korean people? Concerns over the 
intent and commitment of China, Japan, or the United States play a decisive 
factor in the South’s ability to aggressively drive reorganization or realignment 
of the alliance, especially with the scheduled transfer of operational control, but 
there appears to be no consensus in Seoul on what is needed from Washington 
to alleviate these anxieties. Washington deserves to know that it can rely on the 
South Korean government to be clear and unwavering, in both its demands and 
its commitment to the alliance. In return, Seoul deserves concrete, demonstrable 
support from the United States.
IV. The Korean View
The key to understanding South Korea’s mentality toward the alliance is based 
on confi dence. The fi rst issue is South Korea’s wavering confi dence in the 
United States. There is a defi nite, though clouded, distinction between trust and 
confi dence. While trust is almost an instinctive, unquestioning belief set against 
values, confi dence is a conscious reliance on abilities and capabilities based on 
past achievements and interaction. Although the younger generation of South 
Koreans may trust that the United States would fulfi ll its duties as the South’s 
key ally, its confi dence has been shaken because of the perception of a decline 
in relative U.S. capabilities, which has raised doubts over whether it can fulfi ll 
those duties to the extent that it could in the past.
This has become enmeshed with a second phenomenon: South Korea’s increas-
ing confi dence in its own ability to play a more effective role in the international 
community. The result for South Korea has been an unrelenting focus on the 
future, with an unshakeable desire to become a pioneer for framing the agenda 
and setting an example for issues deemed to become key components in ensur-
ing a nondestructive future. In 2010, the priority for South Korea will center 
on how to fashion the alliance so that it adds, rather than detracts, from Seoul’s 
ambitions of becoming an early adopter of future-oriented technologies (nuclear 
power and green growth) and exercising behavior accordant with its economic, 
political, and diplomatic development (overseas development aid). The follow-
ing represents several examples of such priorities:
Set up future-oriented projects. Use the 16 June 2009 joint vision statement 
to detail creative, future-oriented projects for bilateral cooperation.
Offi cial development assistance (ODA) in the specifi c area of poverty reduction 
may serve domestically as a less politically combustible issue, while globally 
ODA could be a sine qua non for future global prosperity requiring ROK-U.S. 
             Navigating Turbulence in Northeast Asia: The Future of the U.S.-ROK Alliance    203
bilateral cooperation. For Seoul, the timing is fortuitous given that South Korea 
is an emerging donor that has been inducted into the Development Assistance 
Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
Seoul also announced at the October 2009 ASEAN Plus Three summit in Thai-
land that it would double the size of its ODA to ASEAN by 2015. Yet, South 
Korea has experienced obstacles in overseas development, perhaps owing to 
the fact that it is still learning to do some of these things. For instance, Daewoo 
Logistics negotiated in November 2008 for a 99-year lease on approximately 
3.2 million acres of farmland in Madagascar, but eventually the deal fell through 
after the Populist Malagasy leader ousted the president with the support from the 
military and scrapped the deal. Similarly, the United States has vested interests 
in Africa, as evidenced by the United States African Command (AFRICOM) 
established in 2007.
In a similar vein, ROK-U.S. space cooperation could become a future-oriented 
project that could serve as an additional pillar for the alliance. In October 2009, 
the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Korea 
Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) signed agreements to exchange experts and 
space-related science and technology. Moreover, the Obama administration is 
planning to expand space cooperation with its allies, and the ROK has indicated 
an interest in joining the NASA-led International Lunar Network, a series of 
space explorations, including lunar missions, in a multilateral dimension.
Bolster the U.S.-ROK bilateral relationship. Appeal to the necessity of future 
cooperation to gain consensus within each nation on the need to bolster the 
bilateral relationship, including the military alliance.
For the future to not be hostage to the past, the legitimacy of the alliance must 
be gained anew from diverse sources, rather than based just on military coop-
eration. For the younger generation, there is unfortunately an inverse correla-
tion between the lapse in time since the outbreak of the Korean War and the 
strength of the alliance. In other words, the further we get from the mid-1950s, 
the weaker the inherent legitimacy of the alliance appears. Meanwhile, the year 
2010 marks the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. Although 
both South Korea and the United States established ad hoc committees in 2008 
to initiate various commemorative projects for the occasion, an April 2009 
survey conducted by the ROK Ministry of Public Administration and Security 
targeting 1,000 adults over the age of 19 revealed that 56.6 percent of those in 
their 20s could not give an answer when asked when the war had occurred (Jung 
2009). It is no wonder, then, that appealing to the past in order to legitimize the 
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alliance may not be as convincing for a generation that has an extremely hazy 
recollection of that history.
The appeal should be on the future, and how the United States can help South 
Korea achieve its future objectives. Even the military fi eld, which is often 
regarded as somewhat antiquated in the context of the alliance, could serve to 
highlight the trajectory of constructive bilateral cooperation. A South Korean 
company, C.N.O. Tech, was the fi rst to develop environmentally friendly practice 
grenades made out of dirt. If green growth could be infused into the military 
realm, there would certainly be a greater motivation for Seoul and Washington 
to cooperate.
Make more use of the abilities of South Korea. Take advantage of South 
Korea’s capabilities while keeping within the framework and spirit of the larger 
rubric of nonproliferation.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference, which is held every 
fi ve years, will be held again in 2010. Although it is ambitious for Seoul to de-
clare its intent to export 80 nuclear reactors by 2030 and establish itself as the 
world’s third-largest exporter of atomic energy technology (Cho 2010), Seoul 
must carefully balance its need to explore its advantages in nuclear energy 
with the risks of attempting to ignore the disadvantages involved in testing the 
boundaries of nonproliferation. For now, Seoul should not aggressively push for 
autonomous reprocessing capabilities, especially when diplomacy regarding the 
North Korean nuclear issue has yet to show tangible results. The past has shown 
that the failure to renegotiate with the United States has not prevented South 
Korea from engaging in bilateral cooperation in the fi eld of nuclear energy, as is 
evident from the January 2010 memorandum of understanding forged between 
state-run Korea East-West Power Co. and India’s largest private-sector power 
utility, Tata Power. Thus, it could be the surge in South Korea’s own confi dence 
mixed with nationalism that may be infl uencing a logic detached from facts for 
those espousing an autonomous reprocessing capability.
In keeping with the spirit of nonproliferation but also advancing inter-Korean 
relations, South Korea may want to explore “science diplomacy,” an under utilized 
but valuable tool of statecraft, especially given the focus on future-oriented 
technologies. Considering that the scientifi c community in the North is tasked 
with addressing issues such as famine, malnutrition, and various diseases and 
illnesses and owing to the lack of ideological baggage carried by science, en-
gaging the scientists in the North can lead to signifi cant alleviation of unhealthy 
conditions in the North while remaining relatively resistant to charges from the 
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Kim Jong-il regime of cultural infi ltration. Moreover, working collaboratively 
on virus-resistant potatoes or insect-resistant corn and rice may be replicated in 
other parts of the world, thus allowing the North to become both a consumer and 
producer-disseminator of a technology—a refreshing change from the one-way 
giving from South to North (and, at the same time, aiding Seoul in bolstering 
its position on the front lines of future technologies). Given the track record of 
the United States also engaging the scientifi c community in the North, such as 
Syracuse University or the American Association for the Advancement of Sci-
ence (AAAS), the two countries can collaborate to engage the North within the 
framework of nonproliferation.
Make South Korea indispensable. Forge an indispensable role for South 
Korea in facilitating regional cooperation, with particular focus on enhancing 
U.S.-China relations.
Building Seoul into a vital constant, rather than a fi ckle variable, in the shaping 
of the Northeast Asia region is another way that could help South Korea lead 
the future instead of being led by it. It is true that South Korea is often catego-
rized as a middle power, one that may often exercise persuasive infl uence but 
rarely exert a deciding force. Seoul will now chair and host the G-20 summit in 
2010, the fi rst non-G-8 country to be given such a privilege and responsibility. 
For South Korea to not become irrelevant or forgettable, Seoul must translate 
its middle-power complex into middle-power activism. In other words, instead 
of perennially comparing its capability in relation to neighbors such as China 
or Japan, South Korea must carve out its own niche and demonstrate “take-
chargism.” This also signifi es expanding the terrain in which to utilize its niche 
through a conceptual shift from exclusive to inclusive: embedding the somewhat 
exclusive alliance that the ROK has with the United States in a more inclusive 
collaborative architecture. Contingency planning of scenarios from regime or 
state collapse in North Korea to post-reunifi cation relations requires critical and 
continual attention.5 South Korea should lead discussions, if not by the virtue 
of its geohistorical ties, then because South Korea in any given scenario would 
feel the biggest brunt of any change.
Moreover, the ROK may wish to leverage its potential clout with the United States 
and relative cordiality with China in playing a facilitating role in reinforcing 
U.S.-China relations (this may be of particular importance given the cooperation 
between the two of the BRIC [Brazil, Russia, India, and China] nations—China 
5 South Korea’s younger generation perceives even Japan to be an important country with which 
the ROK should further deepen cooperation in order to enhance regional security (Chae and Kim 
2008).
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and Brazil—in naval training in 2009, which could add unnecessary heat to 
U.S.-China relations). Seoul might focus on, for example, mediation in trade 
frictions between Washington and Beijing. The Korean Commercial Arbitration 
Board, a member of the Asia Pacifi c Regional Arbitration Group, specializes in 
arbitration and mediation of trade and commercial disputes. If South Korea can 
provide such positive momentum, it will not only increase the value of South 
Korea in the eyes of both the United States and China, but eventually create a 
favorable environment in terms of promoting stability in Northeast Asia.
V. Convergence, Divergence, and Synergy
The younger generations in both the United States and the ROK understand 
the need for a newly defi ned relationship. The June 2009 joint vision statement 
provides the impetus for this new relationship by demonstrating that the future 
of U.S.-ROK relations should go beyond issues of North Korea. While the joint 
statement lays out the broad conceptual framework of a reinvigorated U.S.-ROK 
alliance, concrete policy action needs to follow in order to ensure its realiza-
tion. To that end, Young Leaders from the ROK and the United States display 
different points of view regarding future U.S.-ROK relations.
The younger generations in both countries agree on the importance of the joint 
vision statement but interpret it in different ways. The ROK insists on clear and 
action-oriented signals from Washington that the United States will remain com-
mitted to denuclearization; however, defi nitions of, and actions toward, deter-
rence have not been agreed on by the two countries. As mentioned in the U.S. 
Young Leaders’ view, what action deemed acceptable by the ROK with regard 
to deterrence is questionable. Expressing U.S. commitment in the way of fi rst 
response or preemptive strike would not be acceptable in the ROK, particularly 
among the younger generation. Given their hazy recollection of the Korean War 
and the downplay of the North Korean threat, such U.S. action would not be 
considered legitimate by its alliance partner.
In the regional and global architecture, other issues also need to be clarifi ed for 
a more comprehensive and broader alliance. The United States tries to focus 
on a global nonproliferation regime, restricting reprocessing, and enrichment 
technology. This, coupled with increasing ROK demands for the right to peaceful 
nuclear energy development, already creates tension; the two countries need to 
reach a consensus before the U.S.-ROK nuclear licensing agreement expires in 
2012. Meanwhile, the ROK watches cautiously how the United States deals with 
other issues in the nonproliferation domain. Pyongyang’s expectation of a deal 
based on the past process between the United States and India or the possibility 
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of a future deal with Iran would have an impact on North Korea’s behavior. If the 
way the United States deals with the issue is far from North Korea’s calculation, 
the consequences would be negative, affecting peace on the Korean peninsula 
and challenging the global nonproliferation regime. Hence, how the United States 
prioritizes the North Korea issue and whether it fi rmly upholds the objective of 
denuclearization is important in advancing inter-Korean relations, and the ROK 
expects the United States to make the right choice; yet the ROK has not clearly 
or consistently identifi ed what it considers the right choice to be.
In spite of different points of view of Young Leaders from the two countries 
regarding the U.S.-ROK relationship, opportunities for convergence exist in 
several areas. First, the Young Leaders from both countries agree that increasing 
public consensus is an important task to ensure the future of the relationship. In 
recent years in South Korea, on the basis of political orientation and other issues, 
the younger generation has shown inconsistent opinions toward the U.S.-ROK 
partnership. There has been both positive and negative sentiment regarding the 
United States, yet it should be interpreted as a productive discussion to fi nd a 
forward-looking trajectory of the relationship. Fostering dialogue can help to 
build the necessary foundation for the alliance. To cultivate consensus building 
in new contexts, cooperation in nontraditional and security-related issues—for 
example, climate change and sustainable energy, pandemic outbreaks, ODA, 
peacekeeping missions, and space cooperation—have been suggested.
Moreover, new institutional approaches would be helpful for gaining support for 
future allied cooperation. NATO’s parliamentary assembly has fostered a broader 
base of mutual understanding of the U.S.-NATO relationship. Dialogue among 
legislative members in each country has contributed to consensus building by 
facilitating awareness and understanding of key issues. Given that nongovern-
mental dialogues of the U.S.-ROK relationship have been managed mostly by 
military, think-tank, or lobbyist groups, a NATO parliament assembly type of 
legislators’ interaction would increase cooperation between the two countries 
and enhance public awareness of each other.
Second, cooperation in multilateral settings should be maintained and expanded. 
The ROK is apprehensive about new developments in the Asia-Pacifi c region and 
is also privileged to host the G-20 summit in 2010 as the fi rst non-G-8 country 
to do so. Seoul tries to exert its activism as a middle power in the region, and 
the younger generation supports the ROK’s need to facilitate cooperation with 
neighboring countries, such as Japan and China, in order to shore up regional 
security and economic development. The United States also remains commit-
ted to resolving North Korean nuclear issues through multilateral and bilateral 
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dialogue, centered on the framework of the six-party talks. In addition, the June 
2009 joint vision statement advocates the U.S. role in enhancing security and 
economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacifi c region, supporting cooperative regional 
efforts to promote mutual understanding. Hence, the two countries need to 
develop a collaborative and favorable framework for Asia-Pacifi c cooperation 
that is based on utilizing the U.S.-ROK relationship and expanding partnerships 
with other countries in the region.
VI. The Road Ahead
Young Leaders agree with mainstream views on the importance of relations, but 
they see the preferred focus of discussion to be the road to be traveled, rather than 
the destination. Although both South Korean and American Young Leaders agree 
that we need more discourse on concrete plans of action, we are not in complete 
agreement as to which plans of action should be prioritized. Concentrating now 
on fl ight plans to help navigate the turbulence that surrounds U.S.-ROK rela-
tions is the next step in realizing the ambitious goals set out in the joint vision 
statement. This should be done in a functionalist manner, ensuring that the issue 
is the target and the broader alliance is the tool, not the other way around. By 
immediately tackling those issues that both Seoul and Washington agree can be 
best approached jointly and at the same time coordinating and discussing the 
issues on which the two allies have divergent views will create a healthy and 
productive 21st-century alliance relationship equipped to pursue the interests 
of both countries on both regional and international stages.
It is also worth reiterating that, while there were different perspectives on the 
relative importance of some issues, those of us in the United States and in the 
ROK recognize the need for more transparency as well as the need to build 
public consensus for the relationship by suffi ciently publicizing the benefi ts 
to be had and the means through which they can best be achieved. The United 
States and the ROK have much to gain though cooperation on myriad issues, 
and the benefi ts to be gained far outweigh those that the two would be able to 
achieve on their own. The U.S.-ROK relationship, including but not limited to 
the military alliance, is worth preserving. The joint vision statement of June 
2009 sets lofty goals for the future of the relationship, displaying the confi dence 
our leaders have in us to come up with innovative and cooperative efforts that, 
when successful, will benefi t not only the United States and South Korea but 
also the international community as a whole. Now we need to step up; live up to 
the expectations of our presidents; and create concrete, realistic, and pragmatic 
plans of action to move forward with our cooperative efforts.
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